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Setting the stage
Since 1992, public deficit and debt of EMU
member states are limited to 3% and 60% of GDP
Figures calculated on basis of a harmonized
framework: the European system of national
accounts (ESA)
Consequence: widespread development of
national accounting techniques aiming at
circumventing these budgetary rules; Eurostat as
watchdog
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Case study: the tale of PPPs in Flanders
Fiscal incentive: these expenditures used to be classified “off balance sheet”
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Since 2004, the Flemish region has built
many schools, healthcare infrastructure,
roads, etc. through PPPs
However, Eurostat recently decided to
reclassify all Flemish PPPs “on balance sheet”
The statistical treatment of PPPs in the ESA
Eurostat’s seminal decision (2004)
“Eurostat recommends that the assets
involved in a public-private
partnership should be classified as
non-government assets, and therefore
recorded off balance sheet for
government, if both of the following
conditions are met:
1. the private partner bears the
construction risk, and
2. the private partner bears at least
one of either availability or
demand risk”.
ESA 2010




d) residual value and obsolescence risk;
(e) the existence of grantor financing or granting guarantees, or
of advantageous termination clauses […].
In addition, when the assessment of risks and rewards is not
conclusive:
(a) the degree to which the government determines the design,
quality, size, and maintenance of the assets;
(b) the degree to which the government is able to determine the
services produced, the units to which the services are provided,
and the prices of the services produced (i.e. supply risk)”.
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Research questions and methodology
Research questions: how did the main actors
experience this process? And what does it tell us about
the functioning of the EMU?
Interpretive analysis: Interviews with Belgian and
European officials (senior civil servants, political
advisors and national accountants)
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“External” actors’ opinion about those changes
Supportive opinion (technical level)
• Intrinsic difficulty of the task
“A legal clause can be interpreted in one way by
some people but in another way by others.
Therefore, there is always a discussion” (I4, NAI)
• Learning process
“Ten years ago, one did not exactly know what a
PPP contract was. And we are not jurists” (I4,
NAI)
• Eurostat’s internal consistency
“The rules have been refined. Sometimes it’s
surprising, sometimes it isn’t but the basis is the
same” (I3, Flemish PPP knowledge center)
Criticism (political level)
• Lack of clarity and previsibility
“Eurostat casuistry is difficult to understand
because each case tends to underline criteria,
which are sometimes unexpected” (I16, EIB)
• Depoliticization of national accounting
- “What bothers me is that delegation to experts,
who are certainly very competent but do not
pay attention to macroeconomic consequences”
(I14, former EIB)
- “At Luxembourg, they say: ‘that’s only
statistics’” (I3, Flemish PPP knowledge center)
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Eurostat officials’ point of  view
What do Eurostat officials have to say about their PPP-related statistical
case-law?
Three main modes of justification put forward
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I) Monitoring as a cat-and-mouse game
“When you have a set of rules, people try to get around them. […]
Therefore […] you have to evolve your rules regularly to keep up” (I13,
Eurostat).
 Since governments might be prone to try to “circumvent the rules”,
Eurostat has “to go hunting” (I11, Eurostat)
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II) Negative experiences with PPPs in the past
“And the bad example, it’s Portugal” (I11, Eurostat).
“In Belgium, the objective behind using PPPs is to put everything off-balance. […]
They don’t care about paying a fortune for a PPP – even if it’s cheaper in another
form […]. And for me, it’s a little bit weird because if I was managing public
money, I would try to make a good deal” (I15, Eurostat).
9
“It’s a good way to make the private sector very
rich” (I13, Eurostat).
III) An evolving international context: the 2008 SNA
De facto hierarchy between the SNA and the ESA: “We cannot move too
much away from the 2008 SNA” (I11, Eurostat)
Yet, the 2008 SNA is quite vague, since it is a compromise between two
competing approaches (“risks and rewards” vs control)  When it comes
to operationalize these broad guidelines, Eurostat has some leeway
Implementation of the 2008 SNA as a “window of opportunity” to
formalize a more conservative approach in the statistical treatment of PPPs
in order to avoid potential abuse/misuse in the future
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Conclusion: Is it “only statistics”?
What does the concept of “statistical independence” mean? Even
Eurostat’s decisions are context-laden
Despite its political consequences, the statistical recording of PPPs was
framed as a “technical” issue, which had to be protected against any kind
of political interference  Case for democratic legitimacy
The reliance on “independent” bodies (ECB, national fiscal councils, etc.)
seems to be(come) a fundamental feature of the E(M)U
 Isn’t it time to “repoliticize” public finance statistics?
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